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Abstract: Social scientists have been involved in systematic research on genocide for over forty years,
yet an under-examined aspect of genocide literature is a sustained focus on the nexuses of religion
and genocide, a lacuna that this article seeks to address. Four ways religion and genocide intersect
are proposed, of which two will receive specific attention: (1) how religious rhetoric and (2) how
religious individuals and institutions foment genocide. These two intersections are further nuanced
by combining a Weberian method of typologies, the Durkheimian theory of collective violence,
and empirical data in the form of rhetoric espoused by perpetrators and supporters of the 1995 Bosnian
genocide. This combination yields the three typologies of “othering”, justification, and authorization,
which are further supported by a review of genocide literature. The typologies provide a framework
for analyzing the synergistic relationship between religion and genocide in the interest of devising
a model that can be applied to other genocides for investigative and comparative purposes and reveal
that religion is both instrumentalized by individuals and institutionally instrumental in genocide
perpetration. Individuals explicitly employ religious rhetoric to prey on the fear of the masses,
and religious institutions and individuals are indispensable to lending religious justification and
moral authority to genocidal campaigns. These results may serve as a starting point for devising
strategies that neuter the destructive links between genocide and religion as well as leveraging the
ambiguity of religion in favor of its constructive and obviating potential.
Keywords: Bosnian genocide; religion; religious rhetoric; genocide prevention
1. Introduction
Alex Alvarez, author of Governments, Citizens, and Genocide: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary
Approach, observes that there is a lack of contributions by the social sciences to genocide literature.
As reasons, he cites social science’s ethnocentrism, its emphasis on empiricism rather than theory,
and the “marginali[zation] of state or political crime”, specifically in criminology (Alvarez 2001, pp. 3–9).
The enumerated social sciences are sociology, political theory, history, anthropology, psychology, and
philosophy; the field of religious studies is conspicuously absent from the conversation. This omission
in genocide studies has been most recently filled by two edited volumes that focus primarily on
the religious aspects of several genocides: Omer Bartov and Phyllis Mack’s In God’s Name: Genocide
and Religion in the Twentieth Century (2001) and Steven Leonard Jacobs’ Confronting Genocide: Judaism,
Christianity, Islam (2009). The editors note, “not many scholars have looked either at the religious
aspects of modern genocide, or at the manner in which religion has taken a position on mass killing”
(Bartov and Mack 2001, p. 1). Moreover, “ . . . ‘religion’ is all too often overlooked as an important
factor in contributing to either the implementation and perpetuation of genocide, or as a foundational
underpinning and rationalization for such collective acts” (Jacobs 2009, p. ix). Notable exceptions to
overlooking the salient role religion plays in genocide are book-length treatments of both the Rwandan
genocide—Christopher C. Taylor’s Sacrifice as Terror (1999) and Timothy Longman’s Christianity
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and Genocide in Rwanda (2010)—and the Bosnian genocide—Paul Mojzes’ Religion and War in Bosnia
(1998) and Michael Sells’ The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (1996). The latter work
significantly informs this investigation.
A likely reason for the inattention to intersections between religion and genocide is that religion
is commonly understood to be a contributing but not a primary motivating factor in genocide
perpetration. Philosopher John K. Roth, citing sociologist Kurt Jonassohn and historian Frank
Chalk (1990), writes that Jonassohn and Chalk “persuasively [argue] that genocide—ancient or
modern—typically involves one or more of at least four factors or motivational drives: “(1) ‘to eliminate
a real or potential threat’; (2) ‘to spread terror among real or potential enemies’; (3) ‘to acquire economic
wealth’; or (4) ‘to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology’” (Roth 2010, p. 35). Twenty years after
Jonassohn and Chalk’s influential book, Roth argues for the inclusion of religion among the drives
because “religion can be, and often is, an agitating factor, if not a central one, in any and all of those
motivations. Precisely how religion may be a factor in those ways requires, of course, careful study of
the particularities of each genocidal situation” (Roth 2010, p. 35). Furthermore, “political and economic
competition among groups is frequently couched in religious terms, and attitudes toward members of
other groups and ways of treating them are themselves understood religiously” (Little 1991, p. xx).
2. Four Religion and Genocide Nexuses
The first connection between religion and genocide is the designation of adherents of the same
religion as a protected group per the Genocide Convention; the other protected groups are racial,
ethnic, and national groups. Therefore, religion is one of many group identifiers that perpetrators can
use to target a segment of the population for annihilation. This also includes ethnoreligious groups or
communities that share both a common ethnicity and religious history fused into a single ethnoreligious
identity, as was the case in the Former Yugoslavia during the genocide that primarily involved Eastern
Orthodox Serbians targeting Bosnian Muslims or the slaughter of Christian Armenians by the Muslim
Young Turks of the Ottoman Empire. Second, génocidaires also exploit religious language, using it to
justify their ideology as well as to motivate individuals to commit acts of violence. Examples of this
religious rhetoric include the promulgation of propaganda with religious overtones, explicit references
to mythical religious hatreds, and the divinization of violence. This was evident in anti-Semitic films,
magazine covers, and cartoons that depicted Jews as killers of Christ and styled Hitler as a savior-figure
dutifully completing the work of the Lord by ridding humanity of the Jewish parasite (Jowett and
O’Donnell 2006, p. 231; United States Holocaust Museum n.d.). The force of such rhetoric is that it
re-imagines victims as actors in a sacred drama deserving of destruction that is often supported by
textual exegesis and theological warrants.
Third, religious individuals (primarily members of the clergy) have both implicitly and explicitly
condoned genocide, implicitly by remaining silent and explicitly by actively buttressing state
propaganda or even by physically participating. In March 2017, after over two decades of the
Vatican disavowing any responsibility for the 1994 genocide, Pope Francis asked for forgiveness
for the role the Catholic Church played in the slaughter, lamenting the “sins and failings of the
church and its members” (Sherwood 2017). The most devastating effect of these “failings” is that they
seem to religiously sanction or commend genocidal behavior. Fourth, religion has sometimes played
a pivotal role in the prevention or interruption of genocide and in caring for its victims. Most notably,
religious individuals and institutions have forestalled genocidal killing by engaging in acts of resistance
and heroism—such as engineering the sheltering or escape of members of the targeted group and
their sympathizers—and facilitated after-care by providing aid to victims and lending support to
reconciliation efforts. One of the most well-known and documented acts of heroism is the hiding
and rescue of Danish Jews in Denmark as the Holocaust unfolded during World War II, and Catholic
Relief Services (CRS) provided and continues to provide humanitarian relief to Rwanda post the 1994
genocide. Of the four connections between the phenomena of religion and genocide, the second and
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third—religious rhetoric as a catalyst for genocide and the involvement of the institutional church and
religious actors in genocide—constitute the heart of this essay.
A focused investigation of the religious rhetoric and rituals deployed by members of the political
and church hierarchy, which shaped and supported genocidal ideology, reveals the prominent role
of religion in genocide perpetration. The claims herein are not that religion directly or uniquely
causes violence or that genocide perpetrators who are among the faithful necessarily believe or
espouse that they are doing “God’s work”. Rather, this project examines how demagogues and clerics
alike invoke religious expressions, mythology, and symbolism in order to lend credibility to their
genocidal activity.1 Moreover, the project also examines why this strategy effectively convinces both
the religiously observant and unobservant that the extirpation of an enemy group is an absolute
imperative. One reason that may account for the effectiveness of religious discourse in convincing
both the religious and non-religious among the citizenry is that framing a conflict in religious terms
adds a dimension of gravity2 and urgency that resonates with the masses and amplifies conflict.
The purchase of such discourse is not always due to the persuasiveness of the dogma or theological
reasoning of a particular religious tradition. Rather, it is often due to the presumed aura of moral
superiority, sacredness, and righteousness the use of religious discourse conveys, the presentation of
the ultimate matters at stake, and the authorization of genocidal actions as legitimate and necessary
public policy. Religious frameworks and justifications may be so convincing, given their sacral import,
transcendent status, and absolute truth claims, that they can lead to extreme actions in defense of
ultimate concerns. Hence, although religious belief is rarely the only driving factor in genocide, it is not
merely ancillary to genocide but potentiates genocide in a particular manner due to its mythological,
divine, and ontological referents that transcend everyday reality, are resistant to secular critique, and
heighten the issues at stake in a conflict.
3. Investigatory Foundations: Method, Theory, and Rhetorical Data
The approach in this article brings together method, theory, and empirical data: Weberian
method, Durkheimian theory, and empirical data in the form of rhetoric espoused by perpetrators
and supporters of the 1995 Bosnian genocide. Peter L. Berger, author of The Sacred Canopy: Elements of
a Sociological Theory of Religion (1990), cites the advantage of a tandem use of Max Weber and Émile
Durkheim’s schools of thought, claiming that a “dialectic understanding of man and society as mutual
products makes possible a theoretical synthesis of the Weberian and Durkheimian approaches to
sociology without losing the fundamental intention of either” (Berger 1990, p. 187, n. 2). Here, Berger
is referring to Weber’s privileging of subjectivity and an emphasis on the individual’s effect on
society versus Durkheim’s objectivity and emphasis on society’s effect on the individual. The research
approach proposed herein extends this intellectual symbiosis by coupling Weber’s method with
Durkheim’s hermeneutics.
Employing religion as a disciplinary tool for understanding genocide, the virtue of Weber’s
theoretical approach is primarily his sociological method, which provides a research agenda for
investigating a societal phenomenon using ideal types. Weber’s 1922 posthumously published book,
Economy and Society, was a groundbreaking work in the discipline of sociology, in which Weber
introduced the concepts of “pure types” or “ideal types” as a way of organizing empirical data without
claiming that such an approach could entirely account for all the complexities of social realities or
“action-orientations”. Rather, “ideal types are constructions—models—designed above all to facilitate
1 As a complement to the use of rhetoric by perpetrators to further genocidal aims, see (Basic 2017) for an account of the use
of rhetoric from the perspective of the victim as a form of resistance.
2 The weight and implications of the use of the word “genocide” is analogous to this gravity. Surely, part of what fuels the
debate over whether a conflict is a genocide or not has just as much to do with whether the conflict meets the legal standard
of genocide as much as it has to do with the desire to signal a moral indignation that can only be adequately expressed by
considering a conflict to be “the crime of crimes”. Just as the invocation of genocide communicates a crime beyond the pale,
so too does religious language communicate the seriousness of what is at stake; perception becomes reality.
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empirical inquiry” (Kalberg 2012, p. 130). Furthermore, Weber’s keen interest in religious worldviews
and the power of religious action as a social domain make his method particularly suitable for
analyzing the intersections of religion and genocide. Weber’s method attends to the status of religion as
an integral part of human existence, an argument against considering religion only to be of peripheral
importance when studying human behavior and communities; Weber readily recognized that human
beings have a desire to legitimate their social standing in non-secular terms. David Little quotes Weber
when he writes that collectives “‘wish to see their positions transformed from purely factual power
relations into a cosmos of acquired rights, and to know that [those rights] are sanctified’” (Little 1991,
p. xx). Little correctly summarizes Weber’s sentiment when he writes: “Human beings seem compelled
to evaluate given political and economic arrangements in reference to sacred or cosmic standards”,
which suggests that “religious and related beliefs play a role in human experience and are more than
simply the function of some prior material or external condition” (Little 1991, p. xx). This human
tendency to demarcate groups establishes “outsiders” and “insiders”, which underpins Weber’s stance
on religious nationalism and substantiates the role of religious rhetoric during the commission of
genocides as the ultimate consequence of radical differentiation.
The virtue of Durkheim’s theoretical orientation is primarily his sociological account and
interpretation of human behavior, which frames religion as a functional component or a set of beliefs
and practices, which can contribute to the commission of genocide. Durkheim’s functional approach
to religion, as exemplified by his famous assertion that “religion is eminently social”, is useful for
understanding the role that religion can play in promoting mass violence. One such concept is “collective
effervescence”, which first appeared in Durkheim‘s Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (1912):
The effervescence often becomes so intense that it leads to outlandish behavior; the passions
unleashed are so torrential that nothing can hold them. People are so far outside the
ordinary conditions of life, and so conscious of the fact, that they feel a certain need to set
themselves above and beyond ordinary morality. (Stone 2004, p. 60, n. 13)
Religious rhetoric is particularly adept at facilitating collective effervescence due to absolute moral
claims that render otherwise immoral behavior as praiseworthy. Killing one’s neighbor for no other
reason than their accidental membership in a particular group is certainly “outlandish behavior”,
but eliminating an ontologically evil threat that offends the cosmological order is not.
The typologies of “othering”, justification, and authorization are based on empirical data in the
form of an assessment of religious rhetoric espoused by politicians, religious actors, and genocide
perpetrators involved in the 1995 Bosnian genocide from interviews, speeches, and radio broadcasts as
found in primary and secondary sources. “Othering” is styling the target group as an essentialist enemy
and radically different from the perpetrator group; justification is creating ideologies that legitimate
the elimination of the enemy group; and authorization is conferring or reinforcing the right to act upon
a justification and leveraging the power to do so. These typologies are further supported by a review
of literature on the topic of religious violence, including religion and genocide, which consistently
yields the emergence of, in one form or another, these three concepts. For example, “othering” is
illustrated in Alexander Laban Hinton’s Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide (2002) and
Mahmood Mamdani’s When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda
(2001). Hinton uses the language of “difference” and Mamdani the nomenclature of “alien” to capture
the conceptualization of the group targeted for destruction. In his Purify and Destroy: The Political
Uses of Massacre and Genocide (2007), Jacques Semelin outlines justifications for annihilation, what he
calls “delusional rationality”. Further, Bartov and Mack illustrate in In God’s Name (2001) their central
interest in identifying how humans have historically invoked religion to resist violence as well as how
people have used religion to legitimize mass murder by recoding a conflict as a “cosmic struggle”
that permits killing for a greater good. Authorization, in the form of textual warrants, is a main focus
of several works, such as Jacobs’ edited volume, Confronting Genocide: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam
(2009); Charles Selengut’s Sacred Fury: Understanding Religious Violence (2003); Mark Juergensmeyer’s
Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (2001); and Timothy Longman’s Christianity
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and Genocide in Rwanda (2010). Each work locates the authorization for genocide in a divine mind,
which “mandates” or makes certain action a religious “duty”, and in the case of the latter text, situates
genocide within the context of “obedience” to the Church, politicians, and church officials who wield
a moral authority with the citizenry.
The 1995 Bosnian genocide is a well suited and, unlike many other genocides, well-researched
case study of the intersections of religion and genocide. Per Charles C. Ragin and Howard Saul
Becker’s conceptual maps in What is a Case?: Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry (1992)”,
this inquiry views the Bosnian genocide as among the “Cases are objects” approaches; the virtue
of this strategy is that it treats the Bosnian genocide as “empirically real and bounded, but specific”
(Ragin and Becker 1992, pp. 9–10), and also as a particular case that can be the basis for developing
a generalizable framework for teasing out the intersections of religion and genocide in other conflicts.
A key facet of genocide incitement and commission in the Bosnian genocide was the role of religious
rhetoric, mythology, and symbolism, particularly when espoused or tacitly condoned by perceived
“legitimate” religious and political authorities. The appropriation of religious language and symbols
were a central component in persuading perpetrators to believe (or pretending to believe) that their
murderous and sexually barbarous actions were condonable, and rhetoric is a source for locating
how “othering”, justification, and authorization are operant in perpetrator ideology. Attending to the
potency of religious rhetoric is a starting point for understanding how religious language opens a space
for violence and why it is so persuasive, regardless of whether génocidaires or the general citizenry
consider themselves religious or not. The typologies of “Othering”, justification, and authorization
reinforce and mingle with each other in significant ways, but singling out each of these ideal types
provides a starting point for investigating the complexity of their interaction. Before examining how
religious rhetoric and actors potentiated genocide using the typologies, a review of the 1995 Bosnian
genocide is necessary.
4. The 1995 Bosnian Genocide in Brief
The President of Serbia during the genocide, Slobodan Miloševic´ rose to prominence and
power with a two-fold platform: the Kosovo question and the Serb question (Udovicˇki 1995, p. 297).
The Kosovo question pertained to the autonomy of the Albanian minority occupying the province
of Kosovo-Metohija, a status of autonomy due in large part to the former President of Yugsoslavia,
Josip Broz Tito. The province belonged to Serbia and had long been held as the heartland of Serbian
culture, history, and its spiritual lifeblood. When Kosovo demanded that its autonomous status be
upgraded to that of a republic in 1981, the possibility of Kosovo seceding from Yugoslavia and joining
Albania, taking the very seat of Serbia’s national and religious consciousness with it, was unfathomable.
The second question concerned Serbs who lived in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina who were
purportedly being persecuted and fleeing the country. In response to both the Kosovo and Serb
questions, Miloševic´ called for the restoration of Serbia to its past and mythical glory, which entailed
the creation of a “Greater Serbia”. Contending that Croatian Catholics and Bosnian Muslims were
traitorous Orthodox Serb converts and a danger to the very existence of all Serbs, Miloševic´ set
out to create an ethnically homogenous and mono-confessional Serbian state that included Kosovo
and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Following the declared independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina in April of 1992, Serb nationalist
insurgents activated plans for the mass expulsion of non-Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia, but the
Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina (“Bosniaks”) were the most heavily victimized group during the
war and will be the focus of this study.3 Fueled by atavistic propaganda, Miloševic´ and his political
3 Catholic Croat and Bosnian Muslim clerics also inflamed their fellow coreligionists using religious rhetoric, and Croat
militias joined Serbs forces in the victimization of Bosniaks. However, in the interest of focus, this chapter examines the role
of religion in Serbian nationalism and the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the genocide in Srebrenica with
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associates deployed the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and Serb paramilitaries in an attempt to
create (or recreate)4 a “Greater Serbia” through mass killing (including Serb dissidents), systematic
rape, torture, deportation, and imprisonment. The most widely reported and most intense fighting
occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Commanded by Ratko Mladic´, the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS)
massacred 7000–8000 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2005) Muslim men
and boys in the Bosnia-Herzegovina enclave of Srebrenica in 1995. Srebrenica had the highest death
toll of any single attack during the war, and it is the only crime for which perpetrators have been found
guilty of genocide5 in a conflict that is otherwise primarily considered a campaign of ethnic cleansing.
The signing of the Dayton Accords in December 1995 officially ended the war and divided Bosnia into
two Republics with its own president. By the war’s end, there were 100,000 fatalities (Ball et al. 2007),
most of whom were Bosniaks.
A panoply of scholarship6 substantiates that ethnic cleansing and genocide were prominently
attended by religious rhetoric, public documents, symbolic ceremonies, and mythologies by politicians
and clergy alike; and the Serbian Orthodox Church (Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva) was indispensable
to framing, justifying, and successfully executing the Serbian agenda to eliminate Bosnian Muslims.
Noting how “religion contributed greatly to reawakening and amplifying the Serbian nationalist
cause”, Semelin offers Radovan Karadžic´, the President of the Republika Srpska and accused by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) of ordering the Srebrenica genocide,
as an example of the state/church alliance. On several occasions, Karadžic´’s public comments about
how to resolve the “Kosovo question” were a permutation of the same claim, “nothing can be done
without the Church” (Semelin 2007, p. 86). Hence, before turning to the three typologies, a brief review
of the mythology that inspired the religious rhetoric that fed nationalism and the ensuing genocide as
well as a summary of the Serbian Orthodox Church is required to foreground the typologies.
5. The Birth of a Mythology: The Serbian Golgotha
At the center of the ideology of the Bosnian genocide and campaign of ethnic cleansing is the pivotal
role that Kosovo plays in Serbian consciousness, the story of which often begins with the 28 June 1389
Battle of Kosovo and Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovic’s death at the hands of Ottoman Turks led by Turkish
Sultan Murat at the Field of Blackbirds (Kosovo Polje). Both men were killed. Lazar is said to have
elected the kingdom of heaven, “to die in battle rather than live in shame” (Judah 2000, p. 90), rather than
secure an earthly empire when given the choice by God to live in wealth or die as a Christian solider.
Lazar’s sacrifice solidified his martyrdom and marked what would be the beginning of the 500-year
domination of the Ottoman Empire. Over the course of the centuries, Prince Lazar would be styled
as a Christ figure and was memorialized and immortalized in art and literature. The singularly most
influential work among this literature was a play written in verse, The Mountain Wreath (1847), penned
by prince and bishop Petar II Petrovic´, known as Njegoš. The sanctification of Lazar was complete with
his death referred to as the “Serbian Golgotha” and paintings of Lazar flanked by “knight-disciples”
at a “last supper” who was betrayed by a Judas, Vuk Brankovic, who gave Serbian battle plans to the
Ottoman army (Sells 2001, pp. 180–81).
incidental attention to other ethnoreligious groups, ethnic cleansing, and geographical locations insofar as they contribute to
the primary focus.
4 This nationalist goal reached back to the nineteenth-century when the autonomy and independence of Serbia was largely
realized by the end of the nineteenth century; hence, “Greater Serbia” ideology also harkened back to a romanticized golden
age for Serbia.
5 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic´, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-33-A, April 19, 2004; Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´, Judgment,
Case No. IT-02-60-T, January 17, 2005. The judgment in the trial of Ratko Mladic´ is expected in November 2017.
Among his charged crimes are two counts of genocide, one of which is for the role he played in the massacre in Srebrenica.
See (The United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia n.d.).
6 See (Sells 1996; Paul 1998; Johnston and Eastvold 2004; Semelin 2007).
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At the same time, Brankovic, who converted to Islam, would come to represent all Slavic Muslims
who are “Christ-killers”, “race-traitors” and “Turks”, while a Serbian Knight, Miloš Obilic´, would become
a venerated saint for avenging Lazar’s death by assassinating Sultan Murad (Sells 2001, pp. 182–83).
During the genocide, and even today, Serb and Croat nationalists use these monikers “based upon
the ideology of Christoslavism. [According to this theory] Slavs are held to be Christian by nature.
Any conversion then is not only a betrayal of the Slavic people or race, but an actual ethnic or racial
transformation. To convert to Islam is to become a Turk”. (Sells 2001, pp. 182–83) The Battle of Kosovo
and Prince Lazar figured prominently in speeches by both politicians and clergy, framing the genocide
as a defensive strike by the perpetually victimized Serbs against the Muslim Turks bent on the demise
of Serbians. As one might imagine, the magnitude of this threat was maximized by its invocation
during St. Vitus Day or Vidovdan, the commemoration of the June 28 1389 Battle of Kosovo.
6. The Serbian Orthodox Church
To best account for the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the genocide requires a more
nuanced history that dates back to the end of the two hundred-year Nemanjic dynasty (the legacy
of which still reverberates in contemporary Serbia) and the death of Emperor Stefan Dusan in 1355
(Judah 2000, p. 89), thirty-six years before the Battle of Kosovo. According to Tim Judah, the brief but
glorious Nemanjic dynasty, even under Ottoman rule and the collapse of Serbia, “gave the Serbs the
wherewithal to survive as the nation they are today . . . [because] a Serbian Orthodox autocephalous
(i.e., national) church was founded by Ratsko, the son of King Stefan Nemanja, in 1219”. (Judah 2000, p. 90)
Autocephaly also meant that the church was (and still is) independent from an international structure,
which has “largely facilitated the nationalization of religion and, at the same time the sacralization of
the nation” (Buchenau 2009, p. 1). Tim Judah exemplifies this state of affairs when he writes, “the Serbs
retained, in the church, a powerful national institution. Its survival meant that it was then able to
propagate the notion that, just as Christ had been resurrected, so would Serbia” (Buchenau 2009, p. 1).
Ottoman rule of Serbia began in 1459, and Serbia would not be “resurrected” until after the first Balkan
War of 1912 when Serbia regained Kosovo.
A striking component of the ethnic cleansing campaign and genocide was the copious usage of
incendiary religious language and imagery that were interwoven into nationalistic aims and acts of
violence. Indeed, the conflict in Bosnia was a “religious genocide” in the sense that Bosnians, as well
as Croatians, were singled out for their religious affiliation; clerics blessed and supported the violence
ideologically and logistically; and religious mythologies and rituals framed the conflict as a sacred
struggle between good and evil, apotheosizing Serbia nationalists in the process. Moreover, members
of the Serbian (and Croatian) military marched with religious symbols; Serb Orthodox soldiers forced
Bosnian Muslim and Catholic Croat prisoners to sing Christian folks songs; and soldiers also sang
them as they slit the throats of their captives; and crucifixes dangled from the necks of soldiers who
raped Muslim women in the Srebrenica prison camp.
7. “Othering”, Justification, and Authorization
In the former Yugoslavia, “othering” took the shape of antagonisms among ethnic groups for
which religion acted as a way of reinforcing communal boundaries. The ethnoreligious identities of
Serbian Orthodox, Catholic Croat, and Bosnian Muslim symbolized inescapable memories of historical
grievances and loyalties, whereby Croats came to represent the fascist Ustaše of World War II and
evil Bosnians Christ-killers of the martyred Prince Lazar in the fourteenth century. Demagogues and
the Serbian Orthodox Church hierarchy justified the annihilation of Bosnian Muslims by framing
them as a danger to Serbians—physically, politically, and spiritually—a danger that was made more
immediate and credible through the use of mythic time, making past threats to Serbian security present.
Propagandists insisted that Bosniaks sought to directly kill, demographically overtake (through high
birth rates), and subjugate Serbs to an Islamic state at the expense of Christianity, an assault that
required a defense of genocidal proportions. The orchestration of the state apparatus (largely regarded
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as responsible for the rule of law and order) with the institutional church (largely regarded as a bastion
of morality) enhanced the perceived legal and moral right of the state to act upon justifications for
genocide. The Serbian Orthodox Church did not initiate the genocide or the campaign of ethnic
cleansing, but the abetment of the Church reinforced the state’s already existing legal standing.
Although some public dissent was voiced by clergy, the blessings that many clergy bestowed on the
violence by ritualizing acts of cleansing largely supported the genocidal aims of Miloševic´’s regime.
Moreover, genocide benefited the desire of Serbian Orthodox Church officials to maintain an influential
role in Serbian political and cultural life.
8. “Othering”
The “othering” of the target groups in the former Yugoslavia included the two-pronged strategy
of the demonization of their enemies’ identities through the deployment of incendiary rhetoric.
This included the potentiating element of religion in the forms of an ethnoreligious identity and
religionational discourse coupled with the further distancing of Serbs from their enemies as a distinctive
and exclusive “heavenly” or chosen people. The mythologized Battle of Kosovo found in The Mountain
Wreath was central to the genocidal ideology that began developing in the few years leading up to the
wars in the former Yugoslavia, and its influence cannot be overstated. Vasa D. Mihailovich believes that
“no other event in Serbian history has had a greater impact on Serbian literature than the Battle of Kosovo.
That one event has imprinted itself indelibly on the Serbian soul forever. It takes the central position in
the body of epic poetry: everything seems to lead to and emanate from it” ((Mihailovich 1991, p. 141)
quoted in (Khan 1997, p. 295)). Njegoš’ epic shifted an enmity between Orthodox Serbians and Slavic
Muslims “from the realm of blood feud into a cosmic duality of good and evil; Slavic Muslims become
the ‘other,’ . . . [and]“killing . . . Turkified ones becomes not only worthy, but sacred, raised to the same
level of sacrality as baptism or confession” (Sells 1996, pp. 42–43).
“In religionational policies and military operations, the first step toward the destruction of the
enemy is symbolic inferiorization and dehumanization . . . [and] in . . . religionational discourse,
they are cursed by God” (Velikonja 2003, p. 32). Serbian nationalists “labelled the Bosniaks as jihad
fighters [wagers of a holy war], mujahidins [radical Islamicists], janissaries [Turkish militia members],
and brothers in fez [again referring to the Bosniak’s Turkish origins], whose final ambition was to
turn Bosnia into . . . a fundamentalist state, or a Libya-style Jamahiriyah, in which non-Muslims
would become slaves” (Velikonja 2003, p. 32). Despite substantial periods of peaceful co-existence,
ethnic turmoil was framed as a perennial problem that required a definitive resolution. Religion acted
not only as a community identifier but also as indicator of Serbian nationalist fidelity or infidelity:
Muslim Slavs . . . always posed a very vexing problem for Serbian nationalists. They were
clearly descendants of fellow Slavic tribes, but in their very midst espoused the faith of the
accursed “Turks” in direct opposition to whom Serbian national consciousness first emerged
[in the 1389 Battle of Kosovo against the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire]. The mere
existence of this South Slav Islamic population problematized and undermined the basic
truth claims of Serbian nationalism. By transgressing imagined national boundaries,
European Muslims . . . embodies in their very being an existential problem which
could only be solved through expulsion where practical, and extermination when not.
(Khan 1997, pp. 291–92)
Ultimately, although the Ottoman Empire’s geographic and ruling presence was in Europe it was
never considered to be religiously or culturally of Europe (Khan 1997, p. 291). Bosnian Muslims
were “the great historic ‘Other’ for both Serb as well as for much of the European continent due to
their Ottoman heritage” (Khan 1997, p. 287). Not just different, the “other” falls outside of ordinary
human relations and regard and even forfeits divine protection. The Turks’ status as “other” was
not due primarily to their “alien” status as foreigners to the land but to their betrayal of Serbian
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consciousness and nationalism by having converted to Catholicism or Islam. In converting, Serbians
became estranged kin and were worse than foreigners; they were traitorous enemies within.
Well in advance of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, “influential figures in Serbia (including
clergymen) had begun to shape a stereotypical image of Muslims as alien, inferior, and a threat to
all that the Serbs held dear . . . [and] by their very presence, obstructed...Belgrade’s political goals”
(Cigar 1995, p. 24). This lent itself to an “interpretation of political developments in religious terms”,
as exemplified by the:
analogies [that] were made between contemporaries and episodes and personalities from
the Scriptures or the religious history . . . In some Orthodox circles, for example, the Serbs
were referred to as Christ’s nation, the holy or suffering nation, the bearers of the truth and
divine justice, the avant-garde of the Slav world and Orthodoxy. Serbia was again referred
to as heavenly, and so on. (Velikonja 2003, p. 31)
Clerics, such as Metropolitan Amfilohije of Montenegro (Radovic), the bishop of the diocese of
Montenegro, publicly supported the notion that “every nook of Serbian land and the Serbs themselves
are a heavenly wonder, and an inspiration and example to all other peoples and countries”.7
Such a divinization of Serbs further “othered” Muslims by increasing the mortal, and implied moral,
distance between Serbs and all non-Serbs.
It [genocide] was religiously motivated and justified. Religious symbols, mythologies,
myths of origin (pure Serb race), symbols of passion (Lazar’s death), and eschatological
longings (the resurrection of Lazar) were used by religious nationalists to create
a reduplicating Miloš Obilic´, avenging himself on the Christ killer, race traitor, alien,
and ironically, the falsely accused “fundamentalist” next door. (Sells 1996, p. 89)
9. Justification
Religion initially was a central ingredient to “providing a mechanism for the ethnic separatism
[othering] that was a primary political goal”, and “religious rhetoric and religious symbols were used
both to gain public support for the war and to provide a justification for Serb aggression, and the
subsequent Bosniak response” (Herzfeld 2007, p. 110). While acknowledging the highly specific factors
that culminate into a particular nation’s genocide, Norman Cigar writes, “genocide is most likely to
occur if the perpetrators regard it as a rational, cost effective strategy in pursuit of broader, concrete
objectives” (Cigar 1995, p. 32). The establishment of such a rationale (if it does not already exist),
serves the goals of perpetrators in mounting a convincing argument of defense, such as, there is
no sacrifice too great for the sake of preserving an elected people and their Christian way of life.
The Christ-killer and jihad accusations of the 1990s Balkan Wars were a culmination of “a modern
surge in religious militancy after the cold war [and] a reappearance of a Serbian nineteenth-century
ideology that constructs an ‘age-old antagonism’ between Muslims and Christians” (Sells 1996, p. 90).
The quest for territorial and political expansion was fashioned as a counter-genocidal war of
defense against an insidious enemy group using a hyperbolic religious narrative of good versus evil
and mythologized histories. Far from stemming violence, the Serbian Orthodox Church authorized
the Serbian nationalist genocidal and ethnic cleansing policy by eschewing non-violent resolutions
and calls for a peaceful coexistence and instead “making force a morally acceptable means to use in
Bosnia-Herzegovina” (Cigar 1995, p. 32). In March of 1992, the Serbian Orthodox Church released
an article that appeared in an official journal, Pravoslavlje (Orthodoxy), apparently condemning Serbian
“pacifism and defeatism”, urging “Serbs to view [the] conflict in positive terms”, and characterizing the
conflict as a cosmic battle between good and evil that furthered God’s plan for humanity’s redemption
7 (Cigar 1995, p. 74). The statement was made by the president of the Executive Council of the Serb Democratic Party Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
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(Cigar 1995, p. 32). The article, titled “Peace, Yes, But What Kind of Peace?” implies a rejection of
a temporal peace in favor of an eschatological one that Serbians have an obligation to bring about.
The author, Božidar Mijacˇ, liberally uses religious imagery and metaphors to sanction the conflict:
“ . . . [P]artisans of peace help the evil forces that are opposed to God (and by the same token
humanity) and they are the champions of treason and defeat. In our present Armageddon,
they are on the side of the destructive Gog and Magog (the mythical personifications of
enslavement and tyranny) . . . [the conflict is a] self sacrificing struggle for the purpose of
bringing about this [state of] righteousness is a highly creative impulse and a contribution
to the fulfillment of God’s and mankind’s goals against evil and oppression as part of the
universal plan of salvation”. ((Mijacˇ, “Mir, da ali kakav?”), quoted in (Cigar 1995, p. 32))
The capabilities of religious expression (collapsing of time and sustaining contradictions through
ritual and myth) as well as religious histories (referencing past religious clashes and origin stories of
Serb divine chosenness) were enlisted to buttress the credibility of the Bosnian Muslim threat and
to justify extreme measures against it. These historical memories do not exist in a vacuum nor are
they automatically operative in the popular imagination; they gain their sacral and enduring potency
through Church propagation and ritual:
The Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church enjoy an enormous prestige in
‘their’ respective societies. If a certain version of history is spread from the pulpit, it easily
acquires a dignity it has not had before transforming it into sacred history. The myth of
Serbs and Croats as centuries-long victims needs constant renewal, if it is to survive. For so far
[sic], the Churches have provided solid fuel for its survival. (Buchenau 2009, p. 17)
The cumulative effect of this prestige is that “as a rule, political decisions and military operations
received religious legitimation and were openly supported by some religious media and in public
statements made by religious dignitaries. Thus, they were exalted as actions, for example, in the
name of God” (Velikonja 2003, p. 32). Therein, lies the ultimate justification, enhanced by the ultimate
authority. Sells summarizes the religious justificatory and motivating components of the violence
through what he terms a “symbolic matrix” of mythic time (the 1389 Battle of Kosovo), sacred
space (Kosovo as the most sacred for Serbs), historical memory (the killing of Serbs during World
War II), and a sophisticated ideology (the contention that Slavic Muslims are Turks and Christ-killers)
(Sells 2001, p. 181). An embellished and modified version of these factors appears here, in service to
arguing that claims of a sanctified Serbian people and land, rehearsed within biblical narratives and
tropes, was coupled with collapsed time in order to create an urgency in fending off the imminent
threat of Bosnian subjugation.
A sacred people and a sacred territory: Again, the primary justification for genocide was
an ideology steeped in defense against a Muslim fundamentalist aggressor (who was a Serbian
Orthodox apostate by converting during the Ottoman regime) bent on waging a jihad (a holy war with
the intent of bringing non-Muslims under Muslim rule) and subjugating the “heavenly people” of the
“heavenly state” to the authority of sharia (Islamic religious law).8 For example, long before Miloševic´’s
regime, in 1986, the Serbian Orthodox Church published the following claim: “It is no exaggeration to
say that planned GENOCIDE is being perpetrated against the Serbian people in Kosovo!” (Sells 2001, p.
199, n. 10, emphasis in original), and during a 1987 synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Church
used the word “genocide” to characterize the killing of Serbians in Kosovo. A year later, Bishop Jovan
of Sabac-Valjevo refers to Serbia as “without any doubt . . . the greatest heavenly state” juxtaposed to
8 This accusation was inspired by the 1970 Islamic Declaration, written by then lawyer and later the president of Bosnia in
1989, Alija Izetbegovic´. The declaration was republished in 1990 by Serb nationalists, and Izetbegovic´ contended that the
foundations of a just Islamic state were irreconcilable with other political arrangements.
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a reference to the slaughtering of Serbians by Croatian Ustaše during World War II (Semelin 2007, p. 86).
Semelin makes the following observation about the summary effect of such statements:
a religious rhetoric borrowed from Christianity [that] was grafted on to this attitude of total
victimhood, . . . experiences of suffering . . . like those borne by Christ, transfigured the
story of Serbia . . . Church representatives [took] up the theme of a ‘Heavenly Serbia’ [that]
would one day rise again, like Jesus Christ . . . [I]t is the context in which this religious
rhetoric was used that gave it such ferociously destructive potential. (Semelin 2007, p. 86)
By way of denying that Serbian forces were operating killing and rape camps and obliterating mosques,
the Holy Episcopal Synod, “in the name of God’s truth and on the testimony from our brother
bishops . . . [and] other trustworthy witnesses”, released a document in 1992 castigating the European
community for not interceding on behalf of Serbs who were victims of genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Sells 1996, p. 84). In this context not only must the Serbian population be defended against slaughter,
its status in the world as a divine people of divine territory, not unlike that of Jews as a chosen people
and a “light unto the nations”, must also be preserved. It is not a coincidence that Kosovo is referred
to as the “Serb Jerusalem”. Such rhetoric is “not just a religionization of politics”, but also represents
Serbs as “the defenders of the Christian tradition itself”; as Bosnian Serb nationalist Radovan Karadžic´
stated in a 1993 interview, [the] West will be grateful to us some day because we decided to defend
Christian values and culture” (Johnston and Eastvold 2004).
Biblical narratives and religious symbolism: Situating the Christian Serbian-Bosnian Muslim
conflict within a religious, and even at times biblical, narrative exacerbated tensions and added
a metaphysical dimension to the conflict, conveying the physical and spiritual matters at stake.
Concurring with sociologist Leo Kuper, Cigar insists that the development of an ideology is essential to
justifying behavior that would otherwise be criminal (Cigar 1995, p. 22), and both Cigar and Sells agree
that “ . . . religious mythology was necessary for motivating and justifying [the Bosnian] genocide, but it
was not sufficient. To be effective, it needed to be combined with three years of systematic manipulation
of the army, secret police, religious-nationalist militias, and the media”. (Sells 2001, pp. 185–86) From its
inception, Serb propagandists claimed that the genocide was “a necessary evil which had to be carried
out in order to save the rest of Europe “from the virus of Islamic fundamentalism”. (Khan 1997, p. 298)
Echoing Eric Hobsbawm, Mitja Velinkoja formulates what he contends is the outcome of
demagogues justifying “their policies not only as a defense of their own nation, but also as shields . . .
[in the case of the Serbs] of the Orthodox world:
If one’s faith is the only right and righteous one, then that of the enemy is scorned as being
false, foreign, heretical, superstitious, and even sacrilegious. According to this logic of
symbolic diades, the elimination of other faiths, religious and ethnic cleansing, becomes
a religious duty; killing is no longer considered as homicide, but as a “malicide”, the
liquidation of the evil. (Velikonja 2003, p. 33)
Likewise, the 44th Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, His Holiness the Archbishop of Pec´,
Metropolitan of Belgrade and Karlovc, Serbian Patriarch Pavle (known more commonly as Patriarch
Pavle), also branded Muslims as evil. Patriarch Pavle initially championed the government and
promoted Serb nationalism during the 1991–1995 Balkan War. Although the relationship between
Pavle and Miloševic´ eventually soured, it was not until the conflict was well underway. Expressing his
support of the war, Patriarch Pavle lends credence to his claim that war is justified by referencing the
biblical narrative of Cain and Abel: “Evil always attacks, and good must defend itself . . . . Cain always
tries to kill Abel, and Abel has to defend himself. Defending oneself against attacks by wrongdoers,
defending one’s life, life and the peace of one’s nearest and dearest against the criminals. These are the
limits that define a just war” ((Radic´ 1998, p. 137), quoted in (Semelin 2007, p. 87)). Perhaps one of the
most disturbing biblical references was not in the form of words but actions, as Bosnian children were
crucified in front of their parents onto trees and wooden crosses”. (Khan 1997, p. 287)
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Serbian Orthodox extremists invoked their own religious imagery complemented by denigrating
the religious symbols and observances of the enemy group, which further communicated the
righteousness and sanctimoniousness of the justness of Serbian nationalist retaliation. Keith Doubt
asks if it was “an accident that in Sarajevo in 1992 nationalist Serbs started shelling the city during
the festival of Bajram?” (Doubt 2000, p. 51). Perhaps it was not. Bajram is the paramount feast in the
Islamic calendar that remembers Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son, Ishmael,9 at God’s behest.
God substitutes a ram for Ishmael in response to Abraham’s unequivocal compliance. Is it possible that
nationalist Serbs were so assured of their justification in destroying Bosnian Muslims that bombing
Sarajevo on Bajram was not only an added indignity but also a form of necessary scapegoating,
a sacrifice? By Kenneth Burke and Jacques Semelin’s lights, could the timing of the bombing have been
ritually symbolic?
Serb génocidaires used Christian religious symbolism to reinforce the righteousness of their cause
as well as denigrated Islam in an attempt to obliterate the metaphysical, physical, and historical
existence of Muslims. Per ICTY transcripts, during military operations or subsequent conquests,
1000–1100 mosques were ruined, compared to approximately 340 Orthodox and 450 Roman Catholic
churches and monasteries (Velikonja 2003, p. 33). Religious symbols and buildings were so central to
the fabric of Bosnian culture that the destruction of mosques would severely undermine any attempts
by the Bosniak community to reconstitute itself in Bosnia, even if many members physically survived.
Mythic time. The collapsing or fusion of time is taken up by several scholars, such as Sells
(Sells 1996), and Lieberman (2006). The latter scholar lucidly outlines how national narratives can
facilitate violence using Ivan Cˇolovic´’s point that national narratives, which are a species of mythic
time, create “a direct, living connection with the past” as a point of departure:
National hate narratives typically refer to the past, but they are most destructive when
they shape interactions in the present. Under these conditions the stories of betrayal and
victimization retold in nationalist narratives culminate, not with memories of past atrocities,
but with charges of contemporary violence and betrayal. Historical time and everyday time,
or past and present, collapse together. As a figure in a historical narrative, the individual
neighbour, classmate, teammate or acquaintance, becomes a member of an inherently evil
group that deserves destruction. This fusion of historical and everyday time creates meaning
for acts that would normally be regarded as criminal. (Lieberman 2006, p. 300)
To lend credibility to threat that Catholic Croats and Bosnian Muslims posed to Serbs, ideologues
revived past animosities and memories of genocide through public speeches and ceremonies in order
to substantiate their case that a current genocide against Serbs was underway, making 14th century
references to frame the current situation. The week prior to the Vidovdan celebration in Kosovo on
June 28, 1989 commemorating the six-hundredth anniversary of the epic battle between Orthodox
Serbs and Slavic Muslim armies at Kosovo Polje, Serbs made a pilgrimage to Gracanica monastery to
honor and pray before the relics of Prince Lazer. The day of Vidovdan, Miloševic´ made a speech on the
plain of Gazimestan, the site of the Kosovo battle and near the monastery. Though not a particularly
religious man but certainly a politically opportunistic one, he asserted that “Serbia was ‘the bastion
that defended the European culture, religion, and European society in general.’ Although the mention
of religion in this speech is brief, the subtext is obvious, that Serbia was the last bastion of Christian
Europe against the Muslims” (Herzfeld 2007, p. 111).
The convergence of past and present in the Balkans and in Europe is also made clear in a speech
delivered by Dubak Budimir at the First Conference of the Balkans in Athens in 21–24 May 1992:
Who of the rulers or commanders in chief of any army, except King Lazar, deliberately
for the everlasting glory and immortality, between the kingdom on the Earth and the
9 According to biblical scripture, the son is Isaac.
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heavenly kingdom, chose the latter? With that sacrifice the Serbian peoples entered the
great historic peoples of Europe. Whether Europe admits it or not. The Christian Europe
and the Orthodox faith were defending themselves from the [sic] Islam religion on the
Kosovo field in 1389. The French were aware of that, but today they have forgotten it,
and . . . France and united Europe led by Germany support the creation of the first [sic]
Islam country at the heart of the Balkans, in Bosnia. Has the Serbian people deserved that?
Is that the gratitude for the immense efforts for [sic] the Christianity and for Christ that
they have done? (Khan 1997, p. 298))
The symbolic impact of relics, in this case, the bones of Serb King Lazar, also blurred the past and
present together. His bones were disinterred in 1986, and three years later were paraded through the
streets of Kosovo and Bosnia, an explicit tactic meant to link the fourteenth-century threat of Ottoman
Turks to the present-day threat of Muslims to Serbs as well as to Serbian victims of the Croatian Ustaše
(Lieberman 2006, p. 303).10 A thorough understanding of the inextricable link between the Kosovo
myth, the Orthodox Church, and the emergence of Serbian national identity in opposition to a Muslim
“other” accounts for how many Serbs felt they were genuinely exacting revenge in Bosnia Herzegovina
against the “Turks”.
10. Authorization
The authority, or invested right, to exterminate the enemy group was reinforced by the magnified
influence of political figures, primarily Miloševic´, who were styled as Christ-like figures and heroes of
the faith. Furthermore, the public claims and actions of Serbian Orthodox Church leaders whose role
as spiritual guarantors and divine ambassadors, carried a moral and righteous weight, lending
a “mantle of respectability to even the most extreme nationalist elements”. (Cigar 1995, p. 67)
The Serbian Orthodox church further condoned violence through official publications and speeches
supporting the nationalist government and antipathies toward Muslims (including an admonishment
of Serb pacifism) and aiding genocidal operations through logistical and moral support, even at times
leading cleansing activities. On several occasions, political elites cited the invaluable assistance of the
Serbian Orthodox Church in achieving their aims.
The deification of key actors: Political and military figures, already invested with the authority of
the state, had their authority greatly enhanced through a process of apotheosis facilitated by strategic
public appearances and religiously laden comments as well as the public commendations of Serbian
Orthodox officials. At the 1989 Vidovdan celebration, Miloševic´ stood in the same battlefield where the
Christ-figure Lazar met his end and in close proximity to the monastery that housed his relics. In case
the association was not obvious enough, there were posters for sale at the commemoration “depicting
Christ, Prince Lazar whose promotion of ethnic cleansing and genocide carried the weight of the morality,
and Miloševic´ himself, as a new iconic Trinity”.11 Another semi-deification is the wedding of the
militia leader Željiko Raznjatovic´ (better known as Arkan). The ceremony was replete with religious
symbolism; he wore a Montenegrin warrior outfit with an imposing cross and his celebrity bride
was dressed as the “The Maid of Kosovo”, a Mary Magdalene figure in Serbian religious iconography
who nurses martyrs on the battlefield (Sells 1996, p. 82). “This use of religious symbolism entails the
implication, stated by Arkan himself, that ‘we are fighting for our faith’”. (Herzfeld 2007, p. 111)
Similarly, Metropolitan Nikolaj, the primate of the Orthodox Church in Bosnia, asserted, during Easter
of 1993 “that those who accepted the leadership of Karadžic´ and Mladic´ were ‘following the difficult
road of Christ.’” the difficult road of Christ (Herzfeld 2007, p. 111). A year later, Karadžic´ proclaimed,
“Our faith is present in all our thinking and decisions, and the voice of the Church is obeyed as the
10 See also (Sells 2001).
11 (Malcolm 1996, p. 213), quoted in (Herzfeld 2007, p. 111).
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voice of supreme authority”, and at a Serb Democratic Party rally held in Sarajevo’s Zetra stadium,
Karadžic´ proclaimed, “Tonight even God is a Serb!” (Herzfeld 2007, p. 111)
The moral authority and support of the Orthodox Church: A spate of expositions of the Balkan
Wars agree that the wars of ethnic cleansing and genocide were religious conflicts, in the sense of being
motivated by Serbian Orthodox theology and rivalries among ethnoreligious groups. Yet a few of the
scholars of these expositions also claim that the Orthodox Church leaders did not directly support
ethnic cleansing or that the Church was not an ally of Miloševic´’s (Herzfeld 2007, p. 111), which is
simply not the case. However, to be fair, it is true that some clergy denounced Miloševic´ and his policies
throughout his tenure and that others later withdrew their support, but this break may have been due
to Miloševic´ being uninterested in carving out a prominent place for the Church in his “Greater Serbia”
rather than to ethical objections, per se.12 Most of the church officials who denounced the violence still
supported nationalist sentiments, and the few condemnations were sporadic and untimely. Religious
leaders failed to mobilize their “natural constituency” for the purposes of nonviolent action as well as
to provide a counter narrative to the “folk religion” of the “religiously illiterate population”, or what
Appleby understands to be a “low level or virtual absence of second-order moral reflection and basic
theological knowledge among religious actors”. (Appleby 2000, p.69)13
11. Conclusions
The guiding typologies of “othering”, justification, and authorization are useful for sifting through
the ways in which religious rhetoric and individuals intersected with genocidal propaganda and
campaigns in Bosnia. To be sure, the dynamic of genocide is complex and the function of religion in
this dynamic is various. Genocide architects and perpetrators used religious symbolism and rhetoric
in many forms to “religionize” the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, and its primary effect was making
the violence of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and sexual violence acceptable means for dealing with
an Islamic threat by heightening the emotions and stakes around the conflict. Whether militants,
the faithful, or the nominally religious believed the content of their religious rhetoric is debatable.
Propagandists interjected religious myths, rituals and observances into military life and national
discourse that demonized Bosnian Muslims, and sacralized their annihilation, enhanced by the high
profile of political figures who were quasi-apotheosized. Church officials and their fellow coreligionists
actively participated in the decisions and genocidal actions of Serb nationalists, conveying that the
conflict was of religious import and met with God’s approval (Velikonja 2003, p. 26), whether in
the interest of the state, their own interests, or both. The wars in the Balkans were “religious if not
by its inner content then by its external appearance”, 14 and some argue that the Serbian Orthodox
Church could have prevented rather than abetted the atrocities committed in the republics of the
former Yugoslavia.
In addition to espousing and supporting state-sponsored genocide, the Serbian Orthodox Church
was at times a site for planning campaigns of ethnic cleansing; it was also a site of ethnic cleansing
operations and perpetration. In 1992, the local church in Brcˇko, a town in northern Bosnia and
Herzegovina, was the site of one of the most devastating massacres of the Balkan Wars. The Church
acted as a base for killing, body disposal, and concentration camp operations, all overseen by the
self-proclaimed “Serb Adolf”, Goran Jelisi (Sells 2001, p. 188). Church officials also blessed weapons
12 Klaus Buchenau contends that “later, the Orthodox Church backed Miloševic´’s policies that aimed at a reserbianization of
the province. But from the beginning of the 1990s, the Church grew more and more disappointed with Miloševic´ because he
proved unwilling to accept a major role of the church in society” (Buchenau 2009, p. 5).
13 Also, although this point will not be taken up here, it is important to note that this “folk” religion includes a class element. Folk
religion is most prominent among rural peoples, and a point of pride of Serbian nationalism is that it has a “ . . . distinct antiurban
element”; Muslims were further demonized by as “city dwellers, contrasted to Serbian peasants” (Kiernan 2007, p. 592).
14 (Djordjevic´ 1998, p. 156). Contra Djordjevic´, the view of the Bosnian war as “religious” is not shared by all authors on the
subject, see, for example, Dimitrije M. Kalezic´, who primarily believes the war was neither a religious or an ethnic one but
a civil one (Kalezic´ 1998).
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and forces, conducted formal rituals in recognition of the successful ethnic cleansing of towns, and
supplied chaplains to and fostered the morale of the Bosnian Serb Army by not only spearheading
cleansing operations but making public statements such as, “we have always won the wars . . .
God will not abandon us this time either”.15 Arkan, commander of the paramilitary Serb Volunteer
guard and whose men allegedly committed a number of atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, stated
in an interview that he “received initial help ‘above all’” . . . from the Serbian Orthodox Church in
organizing, financing, and arming his militia (Cigar 1995, p. 36).
If perpetrators of the Bosnian genocide viewed the support of the Serbian Orthodox Church as
integral to their campaign, it may well be argued that the Church could have been a significant factor
in stymieing the genocide. The ambivalent nature of religion makes its incendiary genocidal potential
as powerful as its genocidal obviating potential:
[E]ven if religion was not a root cause of the conflict . . . its implications for the issues of
ultimate reality that influence people’s identities and behavior are significant and need to
be addressed. By ignoring generally religious issues, . . . [it] not only inhibit[s] a correct
diagnosis [of conflicts] but also overlook[s] (if not spurn[s]) the assistance of possible allies
within the religious traditions in question. (Johnston and Eastvold 2004)
Moreover, in Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization During the Holocaust
(1979), Helen Fein “demonstrates [that] the involvement or resistance of religious institutions in
genocide can have a profound impact on the success or failure of genocidal movements” (Longman 2010,
p. 17, my emphasis). “The idea of engaging religious leaders and organizations in order to resist the
spread of genocide has been ignored by those working in the growing field of genocide prevention”,
(Tuckwood 2007) and it is imperative to bring to bear any and all resources, especially local ones, that
are formidable enough to stymie, ameliorate, or even halt genocide once it commences. A critical part
of these local resources are church officials and the institutional church. Recognizing the potential
of religion to prevent and mitigate genocide is to acknowledge the capability of religious discourse,
actors, and institutions to be positive rather than negative forces in conflicts.
The typologies of “othering”, justification, and authorization, then, represent not only ways of
teasing out how religious rhetoric, myths, and actors promote genocide by providing recognizable
narratives of ultimacy and raising the stakes of conflict but also how these typologies also point
toward a strategy for prioritizing how religious traditions and church officials can act as a bulwark
against genocide. Illustrations include humanizing rather than demonizing the “other”, utilizing
religious rhetoric to provide counter-narratives to ostensibly justified violence, and exercising the
moral reach of the church to condemn violence and promote reconciliation. Regarding the latter, in
1996, Sells succinctly captured the importance of examining the role of religion in genocide in the
Balkans, not only for understanding the genocide but also as a basis for moving forward in the region,
when he argues that
[f]uture decisions regarding policy toward the Balkans should take into consideration
the Kosovo mythology, how it was manipulated and continues to be manipulated.
[Moreover], to “adequately acknowledge the role and power of Kosovo’s mythology entails
a recognition that religion is not necessarily confined to the self-conscious articulations
of private faith or piety but has social aspects, mediated through symbols and myth, that
can act, with massive power, upon a society as apparently secularized as the communist
Yugoslavia of 1989 . (Sells 2001, p. 198)
15 (Cigar 1995, p. 68). The statement was made by a Serbian Orthodox metropolitan of Bosnia, Nikola, and a priest in
Trebinje incited and led local Serbs in the raid and takeover of a number of Muslim occupied apartment and Muslim
owned businesses.
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It has now been over twenty years since signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, and the
current reality in Bosnia-Herzegovina is that of a country gripped by genocide denial, failed truth and
reconciliation commissions, and political competition for ethno-nationalistic dominance (Hodžic´ 2015;
Porobic-Isakovic 2016; Dragovic-Soso 2016). Refik Hodžic´ contends that this reality is “a war fought
by ‘other means . . . in political arenas, but also in the media, in classrooms, churches and mosques,
[and] at family dinner tables, and its consequences are bound to have a lasting impact on the region’s
stability”. The part that religion has and can play in reconciliation is a mixed one. Despite the negative
role that prominent religious leaders have played in reconciliation, it appears that the a majority of
those living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who identify both as religious and non-religious, believe that
religious leaders and lay people have a significant role to play in reconciliation efforts.16 This appears
to further substantiate the powerful influence that religion has on both the religious and non-religious.
Just as the force of religious rhetoric can persuade both the religious and non-religious that genocide is
permissible, this same force of religion is recognized by the religious and non-religious as important to
overcoming the animosities that stands in the way of reconcilement.
Well after the war’s end and during an ICTY proceeding religious figures continued to perpetuate
the wars of Yugoslavia as being of sacred and biblical proportions. On 21 February 2008, Metropolitan
Amfilohije of Montenegro (Radovic´), the bishop of the diocese of Montenegro, on numerous occasions
expressed his hostility toward non-Serbs and iterated the duty to fight during a sermon at St. Sava’s
Cathedral in Belgrade in the presence of 300,000 Serbian Orthodox. Additionally, Radovic´ “announced
that the Serbs could not renounce Kosovo neither in this world nor in afterlife, and that they should fight
for it until the end of time, even at the price of death”, essentially couching what is essentially a this-worldly
struggle in cosmic time, a message further reinforced by his status as a bishop (Buchenau 2009, p. 6).
Amfilohije also delivered a telling sermon in the Montenegrin village Krnja Jela, where
he formulated what he [thought] to be the Christian essence of the story [the ICTY trial
of Serbian defendant Radovan Karadžic´]. Amfilohije stressed that everything positive in
Serbian culture was built on the sacrifice for truth, justice and one’s neighbor, and that
“still today the best sons of this people sacrifice themselves. They are brought (...) to courts
where they are judged by those who are indefinitely worse than they. Just as those who
judged Christ on Golgotha”. (Buchenau 2009)
A twin consideration, and a little-explored facet of the motivation for genocide is to what extent the
organized Church viewed genocide or ethnic cleansing as advancing their own interests, even if the
genocide was not initiated by the Church. Douglas Johnston and Jonathan Eastvold make the case
that the Serbian Orthodox Church “gave conditional support to the Serbian political leadership—not
because it wholly agreed with it, but rather out of pastoral concern for the Serbian people [due to]
legitimate Serbian concerns about Islamic rule in Bosnia and Kosovo”. They cite this November
1994 statement by the Holy Synod to illustrate their claim: “[We] do not consider ourselves identical
with the governments on either side of the Drina River but we cannot separate ourselves from our,
although sinful [sic], nevertheless still a People of God in the ecumenical family of peoples, but
stay with them on the cross upon which they are crucified” (Johnston and Eastvold 2004). Even if
Johnston and Eastvold are correct, this does not mean that the Church lacked the desire to secure an
influential role with the state.17 Another roadblock to reconciliation efforts appears in a 2009 report,
“The Current Status of Religious Coexistence and Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, which reads,
“despite 15 years of sporadic efforts, religion today in Bosnia and Herzegovina is more of a hindrance
than a help to promoting peaceful coexistence” (Stuebner 2009). Citing religious polarization and
16 In 2013 study, 54.3% of overall respondents believed that religious figures were either “very important” or “important” to
the reconciliation process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Wilkes et al. 2013).
17 For a chronicle of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s marginal societal status and reentry into the political sphere between 1980
and 1995, see (Radic´ 1998).
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extremism, the report pinpoints that the Inter-religious Council in Bosnia-Herzegovina “is attempting
to implement worthwhile programs, [but] most of the top religious leaders are more interested in
promoting the interests only of their own co-religionists or in furthering other political agendas”
(Stuebner 2009).
Interestingly, these setbacks seem to be tempered by a hope among the international community
and citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina that religion can still positively impact the reconciliation process.
In promoting interreligious interactions, a United States Institute of Peace Special Report on Bosnia
and Herzegovina claims that “where there is a lack of strong popular engagement . . . clerics may lead
by example” (Peuraca 2003, p. 4). Moreover, a report, “Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local
Conditions, People and Trust. Results From A Survey Conducted in 13 Cities Across Bosnia and
Herzegovina in May 2013” (Wilkes et al. 2013), reveals that the majority of respondents believe that
religion can play an important part in healing the country.
The study had a sample size of 2,060 respondents from 13 cities across Bosnia-Herzegovina
who answered 78 questions in writing related to reconciliation efforts (Wilkes et al. 2013, p. 5).
An expressed affiliation with religious traditions indicated that the “sample was comprised of 35.0%
Muslims, 30.7% Orthodox, 23.8% Catholics, 1.9% agnostics, 3.4% atheists, 1.5% members of other
churches and religious communities, and 2.7% chose not to respond to this question”. (Wilkes et al.
2013, p. 13) When asked “How important would prominent religious figures be for a reconciliation
process designed to build trust and understanding across the population of BiH?” 33% of respondents
answered “very important” and 25% responded “important”. (Wilkes et al. 2013, p. 23) Similarly,
when asked “How important would lay believers be for a reconciliation process designed to build trust
and understanding across the population of BiH?” 26% reported “very important” and 30% reported
“important”. (Wilkes et al. 2013, p. 24) Strikingly, the overall sample that completed the questionnaire
indicated that religious leaders were seen as more important to reconciliation and building trust than
politicians (54.3% and 48.6%, respectively) (Wilkes et al. 2013, p. 6). What the study suggests is that
religion can be advantageous to the reconciliation process, which is also pivotal to genocide prevention,
as unresolved tensions and ignored grievances among communities can provide a breeding ground
for future conflicts (Beachler 2011).
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